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Abstract
This paper is about how the conceptualization of ‘culture’ in intelligence
studies has taken on too powerful a role, one that has become too
restrictive in its impact on thinking about other intelligence
communities, especially non-Western ones. This restriction brings about
unintentional cognitive closure that damages intelligence analysis. The
argument leans heavily in many ways on the fine work of Desch and
Johnston in the discipline of Security Studies, who cogently brought to
light over fifteen years ago how ultra-popular cultural theories were best
utilized as supplements to traditional realist approaches, but were not in
fact capable of supplanting or replacing realist explanations entirely. The
discipline of Intelligence Studies today needs a similar ‘intellectual
intervention’ as it has almost unknowingly advanced in the post-Cold War
era on the coattails of Security Studies but has largely failed to apply the
same corrective measures. This effort may be best accomplished by
going back to Snyder in the 1970s who warned that culture should be
used as the explanation of last resort for Security Studies.
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Introduction 
This article is about how a specific conceptualization of ‘culture’ in 
intelligence studies, amongst scholars at first but subsequently practitioners 
as well, has taken on too powerful a role, one that has become too restrictive 
on thinking about other intelligence communities, especially non-Western 
ones.  This restriction brings about unintentional cognitive closure that 
hinders analysis, whether that be with the intelligence professional or the 
intelligence professor.  My argument leans heavily on the fine work of Desch 
and Johnston in Security Studies, who brought to light over fifteen years ago 
how ultra-popular cultural theories were best utilized as supplements to 
traditional realist approaches but were not in fact capable of supplanting or 
replacing realist explanations entirely.1  Intelligence Studies today needs a 
similar ‘intellectual intervention:’ As seen later in the case study section, 
perhaps the gravest consequence of all isn’t a concern about methodological 
or research model clarity, but rather the damage this all-encompassing 
conceptualization impacts the very cognitive processes of scholars and 
practitioners themselves, creating analyses that are too mystically untestable 
when simpler and cleaner analysis is available. 
 
This call for a ‘Deschian’ intellectual intervention similar to the one that took 
place within Security Studies more than fifteen years ago offers Intelligence 
Studies a chance to differentiate itself from its ‘big brother’ and further 
solidify its place as a distinct academic discipline.  Indeed, the emphasis on 
grand strategic cultures made sense within Security Studies (with careful 
restrictions as to when most appropriate), but goes against common sense 
when too dominant within Intelligence Studies.  As a discipline, Intelligence 
Studies too often follows the lead of Security Studies when it would be wiser 
to navigate a separate path.  The analytical conceptualization of culture is one 
of those prime opportunities.  Ironically, this may be accomplished best by 
going back to a foundational premise in Security Studies during the 1970s 
that has lost some of its influential luster:  Snyder’s warning that culture 
grandly defined should be used as an explanation of last resort.2  
 
                                                     
1 Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,’ 
International Security 23/1 (1998) pp. 141-170 and Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking 
about Strategic Culture,’ International Security 19/4 (1995) pp. 32-64. 
2 For the best explicit contextualization of this, see Edward Lock, ‘Refining Strategic 
Culture: Return of the Second Generation,’ Review of International Studies 36 (2010) pp. 
685-708. 
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The present work will first analyze the two traditions within the literature. 
From there six ‘case study glances’ will be offered to show how the positive 
and negative traditions amongst scholars and practitioners alike have 
produced dramatically different approaches and conclusions about foreign 
intelligence organizations.  In all, China, North Korea, Russia, Romania, 
Turkey, and Spain will be highlighted.  The insights garnered will then bring 
in contemporary discussions about transforming and adapting intelligence 
studies and how the present argument could be a positive influence on that 
process.  Finally, two empirical examples (the emergence of radical Islam in 
the 1990s and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014) will be used to show 
how dangerous cognitive closure, caused by grand strategic culture, can be 
when examining the American intelligence community and how approaches 
focusing on organizational culture would have been more powerful.   
 
In the early literature within Intelligence Studies there were two traditions of 
‘culture’ which, while affiliated with each other, were still quite distinct.  The 
more prevalent version dealt with intelligence culture (i.e., as it was practiced 
by actual intelligence professionals) more in the manner of organizational 
culture, with its commensurate corporate-like elaborations.  A second broader 
version co-existed alongside this, tied more intimately with the concept of a 
country’s strategic culture grandly defined.  This version had intelligence 
cultures as a fairly accurate mimic or mirror of the greater strategic national 
culture.  Every country’s strategic culture was seen as inevitably unique, tied 
together by a complex web of language, history, local custom, religion, and 
ethnicity.  In time, Intelligence Studies as a discipline shifted from that more 
humble and explicit conceptualization of culture to the latter, grander one 
that is inherently mysterious and semi-knowable, as it relies on more esoteric 
and highly subjective characteristics.  
 
The consequence is important: This ambiguous conceptualization can actually 
cause scholars and practitioners alike to get bogged down searching for the 
‘intrinsic essences’ of a grand strategic culture when all they should rightly 
focus on is how national security priorities can evolve.  This article argues 
these shifts are more powerful explanatory factors for determining state 
security behavior.  It is very much like a corporate mindset.  For some reason 
Intelligence Studies over time has deemphasized this simple reality and made 
understanding the priorities of intelligence communities more dependent on 
considering a state’s unique grand strategic culture.  For example, countries 
like Russia or Iran are always interpreted through more esoteric, almost 
philosophical positions related to Soviet empire nostalgia or Ayatollah 
chauvinism, rather than considering the very real likelihood that their 
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respective intelligence communities operate in a similar manner to the 
American, prizing pragmatic, unambiguous information.  This process is 
fascinatingly similar to the cognitive closure discussed by Hatlebrekke and 
Smith.3  In short, emphasizing ‘grand strategic cultures’ to understand foreign 
intelligence agencies induces its own cognitive closure amongst scholars and 
practitioners alike.  
 
Thus, the argument here is both a gentle rebuke against how the concept of 
grand strategic culture has evolved to dominate the field and a plea to return 
to the more accurate tradition of corporate-like organizational culture as a 
primary independent variable for examining intelligence communities. The 
proposal here is to adopt the term ‘condition’ to represent the organizational 
concept of culture and allow the grand strategic concept of culture to 
maintain its naming rights.  This piece hopes to create more open 
discussions within intelligence studies as a discipline that include multiple 
explanatory frameworks and the creation of a free and vibrant exchange of 
ideas about how culture is viewed and applied as both an analytical 
concept within the discipline and how intelligence professionals engage 
(and do not engage) it.  To understand intelligence communities, one need 
not be a prophet of a country’s particular and parochial grand strategic 
culture.  Rather, the need is to focus on the dynamic organizational conditions 
that evolve, create friction, and produce change—sometimes slowly, 
sometimes quickly—within the intelligence community agencies in question.  
 
Grand Strategic Culture and Intelligence Studies: Fighting the 
Deus Ex Machina 
Examining the impact of culture on intelligence is in actuality not a recent 
investigation.  Bonthous specifically tackled the issue over two decades ago.4  
Unfortunately, that work showed the dichotomy that would come to 
epitomize the treatment of culture within Intelligence Studies overall.  
Indeed, on the one hand it discusses briefly that cultures can and do evolve 
and as such lead to intelligence practices that also adapt and change.  But the 
concession is rather quickly overwhelmed by grand strategic culture by 
testifying to its power as something shared “across religions, levels of 
education, social networks, companies and industries...even transcending 
                                                     
3 Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke and M.L.R. Smith, ‘ Towards a New Theory of Intelligence 
Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure,’ Intelligence and 
National Security 25/2 (2010) pp. 147-182. 
4 J. M. Bonthous, ‘Understanding intelligence across cultures’, International Journal of 
Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7/3 (1994) pp. 7–34. 
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ethnic groups” and as such will inevitably foster or inhibit intelligence.5  Thus, 
the influence of national culture on intelligence will only become more 
important over time and in that Bonthous helped propel a self-fulfilling 
prophecy within Intelligence Studies.  The justification for this premise is 
based on how ‘national culture’ was ultimately defined: 
 
“Culture is the one element that weaves a homogeneous social fabric 
and survives mergers, acquisitions, and cross-border 
standardizations…Culture has deep, permanent roots in language, 
which, from birth, encodes images, concepts, and patterns of thinking 
into the people…Throughout life, both language and culture serve as a 
means of perceiving, representing and relating: hence the importance 
of language in shaping culture and the importance of culture in 
shaping intelligence.”6 
 
It would be natural to think this ebullient description was just a consequence 
of culture’s fame and popularity across many different disciplines in the early 
1990s, especially Security Studies.  But this does not hold when the work of 
Duyvesteyn in 2011 is taken into consideration.7  Nearly two decades later, the 
other primary peer-reviewed journal in the discipline dedicated an entire 
special issue to what was now called ‘strategic culture’ and its impact on 
intelligence writ large.  Duyvesteyn’s enthusiasm, if anything, exceeded the 
original ebullience of Bonthous: 
 
“Strategic culture can be read from a whole list and combination of 
sources: geography, climate, resources, history, experience, political 
structure, nature of organizations involved, myths and symbols, key 
texts and documents that inform actors of the appropriate action, 
transnational norms, generational change, and the role of technology. 
There are several custodians of strategic culture, such as elites, 
political institutions, public opinion, popular culture, and civil 
society.”8 
 
The problem with the above formulation should be clear: The evolution of the 
concept from ‘national culture’ to ‘strategic culture’ has basically created a 
deus ex machina in Intelligence Studies.  We have come to define culture so 
                                                     
5 Ibid. p.8. 
6 Ibid.  
7 Isabelle Duyvesteyn, ‘Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Some Observations,’ 
Intelligence and National Security 26/4 (2011) pp. 521-530. 
8 Ibid. p. 524. 
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broadly and grandly that nearly everything analyzed has fallen beyond its 
event horizon.  Using such a definition creates several research nightmares: 
how are competing variables controlled?  How are the multiple causal 
variables above parsed out and made distinct?  How can any explanation 
based on such conceptualization be falsifiable?  Perhaps the gravest 
consequence of all isn’t so much about methodology or rigor, but the negative 
impact this esoteric conceptualization has on the very cognitive processes of 
scholars and practitioners, creating analyses that are too reliant on semi-
mystical characterizations when simpler and less ambiguous investigations 
are available.  
 
Even more fascinating, the tendency to ‘qualify but elevate’ continues: 
Duyvesteyn herself declares that not enough work has been done on culture 
within intelligence and that while “the concept of culture is 
undisputed…many now prefer to see it as a context for understanding rather 
than possessing a clear causal and linear relationship with human behavior.”9 
Just as with Bonthous two decades before, Intelligence Studies today tends to 
qualify the causal power of grand strategic culture only to then envelope all 
analysis under its banner.  This is why some scholarly work needs to be 
reclaimed back into the more subtle organizational camp.  The most 
exemplary work of this kind belongs to Davies and what he has done on 
British and American intelligence.  Most scholars have taken his work to 
represent an affirmation of grand strategic culture when in fact its highest 
power comes from an organizational cultural approach: 
 
“Philip Davies has concluded in his study of intelligence cultures in the 
United States and the United Kingdom that the culture of the British 
intelligence apparatus tends toward an integrative intelligence culture, 
while the American intelligence culture could be more accurately 
characterized as disintegrative.  These distinctive cultures are prone to 
specific weak points; integrative cultures are highly sensitive to 
groupthink and disintegrative cultures to turf wars.”10 
 
Davies is rather explicit in not trying to make his conclusions grandly cultural 
from a strategic perspective.  It is the subsequent scholarly citations of his 
work that place him in the grand culture camp.  But instead of highlighting 
amorphous and undefined distinctive cultures (language often used in the 
                                                     
9 Ibid. p. 521. 
10 Ibid. pp. 526-527. 
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grand strategic tradition), the discoveries of Davies are better understood 
through organizational structure. 
 
Might the highly disintegrative tendencies of American intelligence, 
commensurate with the danger of turf wars, be accounted for more powerfully 
and explicitly by looking at its massive size subdivided into seventeen 
competing intelligence agencies?  Might the integrative trends within British 
intelligence, commensurate with the dangers of groupthink, be accounted for 
more readily and clearly by its lack of compartmentalization and segregation?  
The corporate organizational structure of the intelligence communities 
themselves is integrative and disintegrative.  The so-called grand strategic 
cultures of the two respective countries are not nearly as explanatory without 
leaps of logic.  
 
This tendency happens again and again in Intelligence Studies, where 
scholars claim to not necessarily be beholden to a grand strategic cultural 
approach, but then spend an inordinate amount of time being just that: 
 
“Strategic culture is of course a very broad concept but it very well 
suits the treatment of intelligence problems…The main sources of 
strategic culture are amongst others history, experience, political 
structure, myths and symbols, key texts, resources and technology. 
There are several main keepers of strategic culture such as elites, 
political institutions, public opinion, civil society, and popular 
culture.”11 
 
The important piece by Aldrich and Kasuku superbly affirms the somewhat 
spastic inconsistency with which the discipline tries to deal with culture.  
Beginning with the noble cause of freeing the West from its self-imposed 
constraint of an ethnocentric Anglo-Saxon conception of intelligence, the 
piece confesses to the difficulty of creating new models.  What is missed is 
that this difficulty is based not just on a search for new models but for new 
‘grand strategic cultural’ models, just ones that aren’t ethnocentrically Anglo-
Saxon.  They admit that culture is a slippery concept but acquiesce to the fact 
that the notion of ‘strategic cultures commands wide consensus.’12  This 
consensus has a stranglehold on Intelligence Studies: 
                                                     
11 Joop Van Reijn, ‘Intelligence and Strategic Culture: Essays on American and British 
Praxis since the Second World War,’ Intelligence and National Security 26/4 (2011) p. 
442. 
12 Richard J. Aldrich and John Kasuku, ‘Escaping from American Intelligence: culture, 
ethnocentrism, and the Anglosphere,’ International Affairs, 88/5 (2012) p. 1014 
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“Culture constrains how we think our intelligence institutions relate to 
a globalizing world, what tasks we think they should perform and what 
we think intelligence might be.  In this wider sense, we are all 
potentially prisoners in the ethnocentric dungeon…Culture is partly 
about difference, and each intelligence community has its own unique 
interface with national strategy.  Appreciating the importance of 
associated norms and values is central to understanding how they 
function.”13 
 
The very voices claiming culture’s uncertain impact within intelligence go on 
to produce research that is an affirmation of culture’s power.  Perhaps more 
problematic, the axiomatic acceptance of culture is analytically omnivorous – 
devouring everything and blocking efforts to offer alternatives that are less 
grand but more empirically explanatory.  Thankfully, there are other voices.  
There is a significant but small counter-literature that holds great promise in 
pushing less grand cultural theories of intelligence.  
 
Organizational Conditions in Intelligence Studies: A 
Foundation to Build Upon 
The work of Desch and Johnston in the mid-1990s figure most prominently as 
cautionary warnings issued to the Strategic Studies discipline.  First, for 
Desch, cultural variables were tricky to define and operationalize; second, 
some cultural theorists believed that cultural variables make every case sui 
generis, and so the theories cannot be broadly generalized or applicable 
across many cases; third, cultural theories did not outperform ‘hard cases’ in 
comparison to realist theories, which was essential if cultural approaches 
really were going to become the go-to approach in Security Studies.14  The 
dilemma for Desch of cultural vs. realist theories matches up well with the 
present concern about grand strategic cultures vs. organizational conditions.  
 
While Security Studies did indeed wish to produce general theories of security 
behavior writ large, it is not rational to think a similar general theory of 
intelligence community behavior can or even should be developed globally.  
Desch’s central problem with cultural theories is the same problem with how 
Intelligence Studies scholars tend to use grand strategic cultural approaches 
to explain foreign intelligence community agencies: These approaches are not 
                                                     
13 Ibid. pp. 1016, 1027. 
14 Michael C. Desch, ‘Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security 
Studies,’ International Security 23/1 (1998) pp. 141-170. 
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better, nor more complete, nor provide more accurate explanations on 
behavior. 
 
This holds even more powerfully with the work of Johnston, whose mid-90s 
review of strategic culture revealed it to be both under-determined and over-
determined simultaneously and unable to offer a convincing research design 
for isolating actual causal effects.15  Indeed, his warning that the link between 
strategic culture and behavior needed to be handled with extreme care 
(because there had been no success in revealing a direct link between the two) 
is prescient: 
 
“Most of those who use the term ‘culture’ tend to argue, explicitly or 
implicitly, that different states have different predominant strategic 
preferences that are rooted in the early or formative experiences of the 
state, and are influenced to some degree by the philosophical, political, 
cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.  
Ahistorical or ‘objective’ variables such as technology, polarity, or 
relative materials capabilities are all of secondary importance.  It is 
strategic culture, they argue, that gives meaning to these variables [but 
offer no real evidence to support the supposition.]”16 
 
Consequently, an analytical calculus cannot be provided that compellingly 
shows the relationship between culture and behavioral choice.17  Thus 
analyses within Intelligence Studies, when based on grand strategic cultural 
approaches, will always be a bit too deterministic and tautological (i.e., the 
French do that because they are French and the French have always been that 
way).  
 
This fits perfectly with the concept of cognitive closure by Hatlebrekke and 
Smith, who argued brilliantly about the detrimental effect it has specifically 
on intelligence analysis: 
 
“It is helpful to understand cognitive closure as the force that 
manifests itself as assumptions, orthodoxies, and habits. Anything that 
questions or puts these assumptions, orthodoxies and habits under 
scrutiny, thus threatens established conceptions of the world. 
Cognitive closure is therefore a way in which humans protect 
                                                     
15 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture,’ International Security 19/4 
(1995) pp. 32-64. 
16 Ibid. p. 34. 
17 Ibid. p. 44. 
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themselves against any challenge to a secure and comforting 
understanding of the world.”18 
 
Hatlebrekke and Smith rightly contended that intelligence organizations 
might be able to improve analysis by embracing the uncertainty of reality and 
resist the urge to find solutions that would neatly fit inside of preconceived 
notions and predetermined orders of emphasis.19  
 
Hume argued that custom is the dominant guide for human life. Hatlebrekke 
and Smith connected custom as one of the biggest dangers to human 
imagination and therefore one of the greatest dangers to accurate threat 
assessment.20  An approach that moves away from grand pronouncements 
about immutable culture will best describe the world intelligence 
communities actually operate in: One comprised of societies undergoing 
dynamic social, political, and economic adjustments, therefore facing threats 
that also always change.21  While change, especially rapid change, can be an 
inherently difficult thing for intelligence community practitioners and 
Intelligence Studies scholars, analytical approaches need to be highly 
adaptable, reflective, dynamic, and not prone to ‘custom thinking’ or enduring 
orthodoxies.  Failing to do that is evidence of how Intelligence Studies as a 
discipline and a profession can create its own cognitive closure.  
 
While there is no doubt that Intelligence Studies will always be a close cousin 
to Security Studies, with both researching many of the same problems and 
concerned about similar dangers and riddles, it is time for Intelligence 
Studies to acknowledge that riding the analytical coattails of Security Studies 
will not always lead it down the right path for its priorities.  Today, Security 
Studies is undergoing a reformulation of strategic cultural theory so that 
greater relevance is placed on the political practices of those involved in 
actual strategy.  In other words, instead of arguing that certain states engage 
in specific behavior because of their unique and inherent strategic cultures, 
many are now calling for a more critical analysis of its own assumptions and 
allow for greater investigations into the daily organizational minutiae that 
                                                     
18 Kjetil Anders Hatlebrekke and M.L.R. Smith, “Towards a New Theory of Intelligence 
Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse Failure,” Intelligence and 
National Security 25/2 (2010) pp. 147-182. 
19 Ibid. p. 150. 
20 Ibid. p. 180. 
21 Ibid. 
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might impact modern strategy decisions.22  If Security Studies can do this, 
then Intelligence Studies certainly must do so as well.  
 
Examining Foreign Intelligence Community Cultures: The 
Bipolarity of Intelligence Studies 
Common complaints within Intelligence Studies about the examination of 
foreign intelligence community agencies, especially those not residing in the 
West, run the gamut: Too historically driven; completely ahistorical and thus 
nothing more than a simple organizational review of facts and details; too 
often inevitably compared against a standard framework that uses either the 
United States or the United Kingdom as the backdrop.  Such analyses have 
failed to look at how competing conceptualizations of culture engender 
entirely different approaches and therefore radically different conclusions 
about said organizations.  This section will give six ‘case glances’ of this 
phenomenon, three positive and three negative: China, North Korea, and 
Russia on the negative side and Romania, Turkey, and Spain on the positive.  
The cases are a mix between scholar- and practitioner-produced, thus 
showing this problem is not just the imagination of academics but has bled 
into the professional field as well.  Perhaps most interesting and unexpected 
was how states that play a bigger role on the global stage in terms of security 
affairs seem to be more hurt analytically, as grand strategic culture dominates 
their analyses and organizational cultural conditions are often never utilized 
for evaluations. 
 
Russian Federation 
Despite every effort by intelligence officials within the Russian Federation 
since the end of the Cold War to instill a new foreign policy strategy and to 
instigate new relations based on ideas of multi-polarity and balanced global 
power, most American analyses of Russia cannot seem to get past 
characterizing every Russian maneuver and interest in a grand strategic 
cultural way.  When this is done, Russian intelligence is inevitably seen as 
aspiring to help the state achieve new ‘great power’ status or attempting to 
reconstitute Soviet glory or is subconsciously beholden to an autocratic 
instinct that dates even further back, to the czars or even back to Byzantium.23  
                                                     
22 Edward Lock, “Refining Strategic Culture: Return of the Second Generation,” Review 
of International Studies 36 (2010) pp. 685-708. 
23 For two exemplary standards of this kind of literature see Norbert Eitelhuber, ‘The 
Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture and What it Implies for the West,” The Quarterly 
Journal Winter (2009) pp. 1-28 and K.C. Gustafson, “Echo of Empires: Russia’s 
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This type of cognitive closure is detrimental to American intelligence and 
diplomacy because it is purposefully limiting the engagement between the two 
sides.  In many ways the United States, both in terms of its scholarship and 
diplomatic efforts, has blindly created self-fulfilling prophecies when it comes 
to the Russian Federation because of a repeated inability to see past its own 
reliance on grand strategic culture as the chief defining point for 
understanding Russians.  This is what led outstanding scholars like Samuel 
Huntington as early as 1993 to make statements like, ‘if, as the Russians stop 
behaving like Marxists, they reject liberal democracy and begin behaving like 
Russians but not like Westerners, the relations between Russia and the West 
could again become distant and conflictual.’24  It is in the same vein that 
scholars think the modern day has no real relevance on understanding 
Russian foreign policy and national security prioritization.  This incredulous 
overreliance on ancient culture, where scholars and practitioners alike believe 
the roots of all Russian decisions in 2015 require an understanding of the 
Russian soul from 500, even 1000, years before, leads American analysts 
down a rabbit hole of quasi-mysticism and vague truisms.25  This is why so 
many Russian intelligence officials today will privately scoff at American 
intelligence analysis about Russia, whether it is from the ivory tower or Foggy 
Bottom: 
 
“Of the organization of the Soviet and subsequent Russian state we 
can draw no specific indication of Byzantine bureaucratic organization, 
but in spirit the way the Soviets organized their government for 
security purposes is still quite Russian…the way the Byzantines 
managed their security and intelligence was a function of the political 
culture of the state, the same political culture that was inherited later 
by the Kievan and then Russian state, which has served the Soviet and 
subsequent post-Soviet Russian state.”26 
 
The above is truly a common exemplar of the kind of analysis that passes for 
grand strategic culture when examining Russian intelligence.  Not only are 
the arguments non-scientific, they are ultimately spurious: These analyses are 
not trying to ascertain the true motivations of contemporary Russian 
intelligence decisions.  Rather, they are trying to make sure Russia stays 
                                                                                                                                                 
Inheritance of Byzantine Security Culture,” Journal of Slavic Military Culture 23 (2010) 
pp. 574-596. 
24 Eitelhuber, ‘The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture,” p. 20. 
25 K.C. Gustafson, “Echo of Empires,” p. 576.   
26 Ibid. p. 591. 
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within the historic-cultural frame that already exists.  This is cognitive closure 
at its worst: The question ‘why do they do what they do?’ transforms instead 
into ‘what kind of Russia do we want and how do we make sure it becomes 
that and that alone?’27  Grand strategic cultural thinking on Russian 
intelligence reveals relatively little about modern Russian thinking for 
American analysts, but it reveals a wealth of information on American 
thinking for Russian analysts.  
 
North Korea 
Some of the more interesting analyses on North Korea are coming out of the 
Korean peninsula itself, from native scholars with a personal stake in the 
future of the Hermit Kingdom.  It is fascinating to see how the pervasive 
impact of grand strategic culture has filtered out:  
 
“[To understand North Korea, we] will apply the concept of strategic 
culture, which refers to the way a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, 
patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements, and methods of 
environmental adaptation [in the face of] threat and use of 
force…These beliefs and values emanate from such fundamental 
influences as geopolitical setting, history, and political culture. They 
collectively constitute a strategic culture that persists over time and 
influences the formation and execution of strategy.”28 
 
The problem begins with the analytical tendency to define strategic culture in 
such a way that it becomes basically a witches’ brew of so many divergent 
variables that one can explain absolutely everything while saying nothing.  If 
anything the definition of strategic culture above goes even further than some 
of the earlier definitions elaborated.  But there seems to be the greater 
possibility of moving away from grand strategic culture because of the 
frustration that it leaves little flexibility for new engagement.  In North 
Korea’s case some are starting to discuss the concept of ‘comprehensive 
security’ so as to incorporate ‘low politics,’ focusing on specific daily tasks and 
issue areas.29 
 
The elaboration of comprehensive security is eerily similar to the 
organizational cultural conditions approach. Most important is to see Korean 
scholars and practitioners declaring ‘strategic culture’ too rigid and 
                                                     
27 Eitelhuber, ‘The Russian Bear: Russian Strategic Culture,” p. 24.   
28 Yong-Pyo Hong, “North Korea’s Strategic Culture and Threat Perception: Implications 
for Regional Security Cooperation,” Korea Observer 42/1 (2011) p. 96-97. 
29 Ibid. p. 111. 
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constraining when what is most readily needed is an approach that allows 
dynamic complex reality to have more causal sway.  The failure to engage 
such new approaches is seen as dooming the peninsula to intelligence analysis 
that is going to be a vicious circle of negative geopolitical, historical, and 
ideological legacies.30 
 
China 
Unlike the Korean peninsula, Chinese scholarship seems still interested in the 
power of grand strategic culture as an explanation for national security 
behavior.  Unfortunately, there does not seem to be any innovation in how the 
Chinese embrace the concept compared to the Americans.  Consequently, 
Chinese analysis of its own national security and intelligence community 
tends to be somewhat incoherent if not cliché: 
 
“China has a long history with 5000 years of splendid civilization…the 
year 1840 is a turning point of not only ancient China’s history but also 
ancient China’s national security. The year 1949 is another turning 
point for China’s national security. Contemporary China is a 
continuation of historical China…China’s national security is deeply 
affected by her traditional culture and history…China is accustomed to 
a set philosophy and standard rules in which to engage and watch the 
world…This impacts Chinese thinking, judgment, behavior, as well as 
influences China’s national security.”31 
 
Informally, this should be called the Sun-Tzu syndrome: There should be a 
challenge in academia for anyone covering Chinese security and intelligence 
to write without somehow using a reference to Sun-Tzu as the catch-all 
explanation to properly understand the Chinese world view.  Again, keep in 
mind the important distinction made between Security Studies, where such 
grand cultural legacies can and should enter the thinking of scholars, and 
Intelligence Studies, where more pragmatic analyses based on corporate 
organizational thinking is more powerful for understanding intelligence 
agencies.  The goal is not to dismiss strategic culture as a concept for all of 
academia: rather it is to illustrate how often it gets improperly overused 
                                                     
30 Ibid. p. 110-111. 
31 Chen Ou, ‘The Characteristics of China’s National Security,’ Journal of Politics and 
Law 4/1 (2011) pp. 84; 92. It should be noted that this native piece suffered from poor 
written English. I took the liberty of cleaning up the grammar and proper flow of the 
English language to make the point of the author more coherent to native English 
readers. In no way was the substantive content or analytical argument of the original 
author changed or degraded. 
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within Intelligence Studies and subsequently hinders the power and accuracy 
of such analyses.  
 
These three ‘case glances’ reveal a stark tendency: countries that have a major 
role on the global stage seem to be stuck in the grand strategic cultural trap.  
Sometimes this trap is set by others (Russia); other times this trap is largely 
set by the countries themselves (North Korea and China).  Regardless, the end 
result is the same: diatribes about ‘crucially important’ ancient wisdoms and 
historical ghosts that do not reveal much empirical insight on actual 
contemporary intelligence within said countries.  The following three cases all 
involve ‘lesser’ countries in terms of their global prominence within security 
and intelligence.  How they differ, however, proves quite interesting for the 
arguments being made here.  
 
Spain 
Somehow Spain has managed to avoid the ‘curse of Isabelle and Ferdinand’ 
when it comes to how it evaluates its own intelligence community.  In Spain’s 
case, there is remarkable focus on the organizational cultural conditions and 
as a result Spanish analysis tends to be more dynamic, adaptable, and 
empirically engaged.  
 
“Spain’s IC represents a clear problem of articulation which prevents it 
from becoming a satisfactory instrument for elaborating the country’s 
foreign and security policy.  The existing legal framework in Spain 
enables a plurality of formations and evolutions so that in principle 
there is no need for a new legal regulation; there is, however, an urgent 
need for reflection at the highest level on the model of community that 
Spain needs and wants, and its consequent formalization so that all the 
actors involved will know what kind of model the Executive wants, the 
role to be played by each actor and the mechanisms to be followed for 
its coordination and control.”32 
 
The differentiation in language, focus, and execution of analysis could not be 
more dramatic.  There is no kvetching about lost empire or the need to 
somehow honor the enduring spiritual debt of the Spanish Armada. And 
make no mistake: the manner in which grand strategic cultural analysis tends 
to be used in Intelligence Studies would demand this kind of language.  If 
                                                     
32 Antonio M. Diaz Fernandez, “The Spanish Intelligence Community: A Diffuse Reality,” 
Intelligence and National Security 25/2 (2010) p.242. 
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Russia is dependent on the legacy of the Byzantine Empire and China is hard-
pressed to move beyond the ideas of Sun-Tzu, then it is simply hypocritical to 
not make Spain beholden to the same type of historical and cultural legacies.  
Yet these native scholars are not beholden to it.  What is their main concern 
when analyzing the contemporary formulation and future of the Spanish 
intelligence community is the laws, human agents, organizations, 
contemporary security priorities, and the complex dynamic interplay between 
the various vested actors? 
 
When the focus remains tight on these organizational cultural conditions, 
scholarship tends to be more empirically accurate, capable of being tested by 
others, and open to change (a crucial constant in today’s world of intelligence 
community operations).  The previous three cases, all overly dependent on 
emphasizing grand strategic culture, lacked all of these qualities and as a 
result produced analytical results that were less than informative.  
 
Turkey 
Turkey intensifies the characteristics seen in the Spanish case. Analyses on 
Turkish intelligence tend to be dominated by the ever-changing current and 
future developments of the Turkish state.  Rather than trying to adhere to 
some ancient tract that demands a particular mindset and behavioral tactic, 
Turkish intelligence by default must be ready to always adjust and adapt to 
the unpredictable domestic and foreign policy winds.  
 
“What intelligence is the Turkish intelligence community interested 
in?  First and foremost, it is concerned with any intelligence that would 
contribute to national security and public safety.  A second interest is 
solid intelligence that would support Turkey’s active role and interest 
in balancing the influence of Iran and Russia in the Balkan, Middle 
Eastern, and Caucasian triangle, which is the primary focus of Turkey’s 
regional security policies.  Third, it is seeking good quality foreign 
intelligence to allow the government to have a modicum of 
international influence.”33 
 
Just as with Spain, Turkey emphasizes the now when it evaluates and 
assesses its intelligence community.  There is no point droning on about the 
legacy of the Ottoman Empire or the spirit of Ataturk or what it historically 
means to be the Western-Eastern crossroads for humanity.  These cultural 
                                                     
33 Stephane Lefebvre, “Turkey’s Intelligence Community in Changing Times,” 
International Journal 61/1 (2005-2006) p. 113. 
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and historical legacies matter if you are a Turk.  But they do not explicitly and 
powerfully impact Turkish intelligence as it watches what happens in Syria, or 
tries to decide how to respond to the Islamic State, or considers various 
overtures from the United States, Israel and the EU on hindering Iranian 
nuclear development, or grows weary about a strengthening Kurdish 
autonomy in Northern Iraq, just to name several prominent contemporary 
examples.  
 
Grand strategic cultural approaches have very little to say to these real-time 
dilemmas and it is these priorities that occupy the thinking of Turkish 
intelligence today.  So, analysis that wants to properly evaluate the national 
security decision-making calculus of Turkey is much better off focusing on the 
organizational cultural conditions that demand the attention, budget, and 
leadership of Turkish intelligence.  The explanatory power of these analyses is 
in the substantive relevance that can be addressed when not shackled by 
ancient historical and cultural legacies.  They make for wonderful stories but 
not very compelling intelligence product.  
 
Romania 
Fascinatingly, Romania seems to be a state that has actually adopted 
organizational cultural conditions not simply as an academic approach for 
intelligence analysis but as an actual corporate philosophy for its intelligence 
community.  It recently pushed for developing the cognitive skills of its 
intelligence agents, seeking to formalize an educational reform program that 
can produce intelligence leaders that have “deep and flexible 
multidimensional thinking.”34  The reasoning for this push is that Romanian 
intelligence believes the ability to produce creative solutions to complex 
operational and strategic problems is hugely impactful for reducing future 
conflicts.35  Romanian intelligence has made a direct causal link between 
organizational culture and proper cognitive functioning that should be the 
envy of Intelligence Studies scholars: 
 
“Specific cognitive skills require critical evaluation of the results of 
new research, the formulation of alternative understandings and the 
demonstration of relevance, including the creative application of 
research methods and the design and management of domain-specific 
processes…The fundamentals of organizational culture [that we apply 
                                                     
34 Constantin Stan and George Negru, “Culture of Intelligence and the Training of the 
Intelligence Officers,” National Defence University Special Report (2012) pp. 167-173. 
35 Ibid. p. 170. 
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to future intelligence officers] should be based on the progressive 
transformation of our leaders so that we institutionalize such training 
in terms of conceptual and decision-making factors so that we exhibit 
interdisciplinary thinking that is fast, adaptable, proactive, open, 
flexible, and unconventional...”36 
 
The last sentence epitomizes why this approach is superior to grand strategic 
cultural concerns for Intelligence Studies: Any intelligence community 
operating around the world today would testify to the importance of being 
fast, adaptable, proactive, and flexible.  It is the inability to be such things that 
leads to intelligence failure.  So it should not be surprising that the inability to 
be that intellectually also leads to faulty or imprecise research within 
Intelligence Studies.  
 
What these cases powerfully exposed was the dramatic difference in analytical 
end-product: An emphasis on grand strategic culture will make for better 
reading, as one is taken down a road of the most interesting historical 
impacts, sometimes going back thousands of years.  Organizational cultural 
conditions will instead examine budget concerns, internal turf wars over 
specific issue-areas, and the changing dynamics of micro-subjects that might 
not even make the article, let alone an historical novel.  But those are the 
things that reveal the most about the contemporary prioritizing of intelligence 
communities.  More importantly, the more powerful intelligence countries are 
dominated by grand strategic cultural analyses.  Perhaps that is a reason so 
little headway is made engaging intelligence communities like China, Russia, 
and North Korea. 
 
Hope for the ‘Lesser Culture:’ New Research into Intelligence 
Transformation  
While this work has shown how quickly cognitive closure occurs within grand 
strategic cultural approaches in intelligence analysis, both from a scholarly 
and practitioner perspective, both within the United States and far beyond it, 
it has also shown that there are counter-approaches being developed to wean 
Intelligence Studies off of such overreliance.  At the moment, these 
approaches are disparate and terminologically diverse, which actually 
prevents scholars from realizing they are working within the same school of 
thought.  But there have been in the last half dozen years some stirrings on 
this front which will hopefully continue to grow and advance.  If successful, it 
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will emphasize the power of purpose-based decision-making rather than 
predetermined thought-processes for intelligence analysis and research.  
 
The work of an intelligence community is by default messy.  Not only does it 
normally have to tackle extremely diverse, even radically contradictory, 
threats and forces, it usually has to deal with an internal bureaucracy that is 
highly compartmentalized.37  It is surprising, therefore, that the effort to 
increase efficiency to improve intelligence analysis is really not that old. 
Hammond was one of the first to examine the creation, post-9/11, of purpose-
based centers that were intended to ensure the integration and coordination 
of terrorism-related information held anywhere within the intelligence 
community.38  But as was seen in Spain and Turkey and Romania, there is a 
problem here with semantics: purpose-based is really nothing more than a 
shift toward emphasizing organizational cultural conditions over grand 
strategic theory.  It is the reincorporation of daily foci to a place of 
prominence in intelligence evaluation.  
 
This same effort occurred just two years after Hammond’s work in 2009 at 
Harvard’s Kennedy School with the Defense Leadership Project.  Born out of 
the so-called frustration with leadership within the U.S. Intelligence 
Community (characterized as routinely being ill-equipped to understand, 
visualize, or respond effectively to the modern security environment), it 
found the solution to the problem in adaptation.39  A significant problem 
hindering the power of these approaches is the failure to realize how much 
they are all about the competing conceptualizations of culture.  Cognitive 
closure caused by grand strategic culture is what causes leadership to be ill-
equipped to understand the modern environment.  This is because grand 
strategic culture does not try to evolve with contemporary realities: It tries to 
sledgehammer the messy complexity of contemporary reality into its own 
historically-predetermined boxes.   
 
To a large extent this piece is trying to affirm Immerman’s work on 
transforming analysis and supports his classification of this effort as 
something more than just a random series of chance scholarly encounters:  
 
                                                     
37 Thomas H. Hammond, “Why is the Intelligence Community so Difficult to Redesign? 
Smart Practices, Conflicting Goals, and the Creation of Purpose-Based Organizations,” 
Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions 20/3 
(2007) pp. 401-422. 
38 Ibid. pp.419-421. 
39 Defense Leadership Project, “Transforming the National Security Culture,” Harvard 
Kennedy School (2009) pp. 9-35. 
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“The movement, and it is a movement, to reform and thereby improve 
intelligence analysis goes by the title Analytic 
Transformation…Analytic Transformation’s goal is as simple as it is 
dramatic: to get the right analysis to the right people at the right time, 
in a form they can use. The strategy is equally commonsensical: to 
transform the analytic component of our community from a federation 
of agencies, or a collection of feudal baronies, into a community of 
analysts.”40 
 
The cacophony of diverse terms continues.  These efforts to overcome “feudal 
baronies, ill-equipped leadership, and face more efficiently a complex messy 
reality” are intensified and improved by a switch to the so-called ‘lesser 
culture.”41  As Immerman attested to, the transition from bipolarity to 
globalization has meant in the intelligence world a switch to new phenomena, 
challenges, and threats, many of which are asymmetrical, obscure, highly 
evolving, non-traditional, and fast moving.42  The Analytic Transformation 
‘movement’ highlighted above is accomplished more competently by focusing 
on organizational cultural conditions.  These various groups are already 
speaking the language of the approach without realizing it.  
 
Conclusion: Stepping Out of the Shadow of Security Studies 
What works for scholars within Security Studies will not necessarily work well 
for scholars in Intelligence Studies.  There are two final examples to share to 
illustrate how nefarious and limiting cognitive closure can be when it comes 
to the application of culture in intelligence research and analysis: The 
American intelligence reaction to the rise of radical Islam in the 1990s, 
specifically al-Qaida, and the current conflict today in Eastern Ukraine.  
Examining these two incidents show how easy it is to be really smart in 
intelligence and still fail.  
 
There are numerous scholarly, diplomatic, and journalistic confirmations 
testifying to the fact that the United States always had ample opportunity to 
understand the threat Usama bin Laden (UBL) and al-Qaida represented to 
the country.  While this ‘intelligence failure’ has been examined from 
numerous sides - communication gaps, bureaucratic infighting, turf wars—
what has been largely ignored is the fact that America’s national myopia on 
                                                     
40 Richard H. Immerman, ‘Transforming Analysis: The Intelligence Community’s Best 
Kept Secret,’ Intelligence and National Security 26/2-3 (2011) p.163. 
41 Ibid. p. 165. 
42 Ibid. 
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this issue can be cogently explained by its over-reliance on grand strategic 
culture.  This dictated that America was impervious to any external terrorist 
threat.  This is only more bitterly ironic (and affirmation of how 
psychologically deep grand strategic cultural cognitive closure can go) given 
that the ‘failed’ 1993 World Trade Center attack was a failure simply because 
it did not succeed in leveling the building.  Analysts seem to have ignored the 
success of actually gaining access to and detonating an explosive device within 
its grounds.  If intelligence analysts had focused on the more organizational 
cultural conditions, then all of the aforementioned information could have 
gained greater focus and relevance and the ‘success’ aspect of the 1993 
operation would have triggered much greater investigation.  
 
This analytical blind spot in intelligence has been documented for some time 
but never connected before to the concept of cognitive closure.  Studies going 
as far back as Pearl Harbor have shown that the country attacked has almost 
always had in its possession ample early intelligence that, given a different 
analytical approach and mindset, would have enabled the possibility of setting 
up a defense or counterintelligence operation.43  And while Intelligence 
Studies as a discipline has not viewed the rise of al-Qaida in the 1990s from 
this perspective, it seems rather powerful in explaining why the relevance of 
so much was simply ignored: the first 1993 attack; the official UBL 
declaration of war against the United States in the mid-1990s; and the FBI’s 
failure to follow-up on reports about Arab men taking flight school in America 
without showing any interest in learning how to land jumbo jets in the 
simulators in 2000.  That intelligence was not missed: Cognitive closure 
brought on by over-reliance on a grand strategic cultural concept that 
America was immune to domestic attack from abroad caused that intelligence 
to be de-prioritized. 
 
The conflict in Ukraine today is still massively misconstrued and misinformed 
in the West.  Once again, over-reliance on grand strategic culture pushes the 
problem.  Fascinatingly, it shows how quickly it can lead an analyst down odd 
paths.  First, grand strategic culture made those in the West believe there 
could never be conflict between Ukraine and Russia.  After all, Russia cites its 
own cultural beginning from the Kievan Rus.  But once the conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine began in earnest, grand strategic cultural thinking quickly discarded 
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this original doubt and moved on to embrace the next version: One that 
assumed Russian aspiration for re-establishing empire (whatever that 
actually means has never been defined of course).  So, grand strategic culture 
first could not predict the conflict’s emergence and then did not do a good job 
at explicitly defining the purpose behind the conflict being prolonged.  
 
When utilizing an organizational cultural approach for intelligence, however, 
one is forced to look more carefully at the economic, political, and military 
agreements that were already in place and meant to be enforced when the 
Maidan revolution took place in Kiev and forced the Ukrainian President to 
flee.  Focusing on the aftermath of that removal and the consequences to 
those micro-realities goes much farther in explaining how the conflict 
proceeded to Crimea and across Eastern Ukraine.  The failure of the West to 
understand this or to continue to push a ‘grand strategic cultural analysis’ 
actually forces recalcitrance and indignation from the Russian side.  This is 
damning evidence of how grand strategic culture within Intelligence Studies 
today can force analysts to think in limited, stereotypical, and highly 
polarizing ways, thereby producing intelligence product that does not help 
decision-makers but may actually exacerbate a conflict situation.  Worse still, 
in both of the examples above, the scholarly community tends to mimic this 
practitioner foible.  As a result, an echo chamber of sorts develops where the 
academic community and intelligence community, professor and practitioner, 
do not spur new ideas or challenge orthodoxies but simply reinforce the status 
quo analytical mantra.  Instead of each side being something of a loose check 
and balance, they end up more often simply pushing forward and reinforcing 
tired clichés as in-depth analysis. 
 
This piece started with a call for a Deschian intervention in Intelligence 
Studies because of the discipline’s failure to notice some of its own analytical 
missteps when evaluating foreign intelligence community agencies.  It also 
suffered from an apparent lack of initiative to differentiate itself more fully 
from Security Studies.  The idea of developing an approach more akin to 
corporate organizational culture, focusing on purpose-driven, complex, 
dynamic reality, and allowing intelligence communities to adapt and change 
needs to be pushed more to the forefront.  This approach brings to 
Intelligence Studies not only more accurate research but gives practitioners 
better end-products.  It also begins to set a separate analytical space apart 
from Security Studies.  This differentiation would be good for both disciplines 
and would make Intelligence Studies more readily seen as a distinct and fully-
developed academic discipline.  This win-win would be most welcome not just 
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in the ivory tower for intelligence but in the real-world when it comes to 
ameliorating conflict.  
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